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1
Abstract
This paper studies a resource allocation problem in which each individual is re-
sponsible but in general only partially for his initial endowment. We consider pure-
exchange economies with initial endowments but we do not assume the individual
rationality axiom, taking that the society consists of citizens who cannot opt out
from it. We characterize a class of allocation rules which are parametrized by income
redistribution codes. In particular, we characterize a one-parameter family of income
redistribution codes, in which one extreme corresponds to the case that everybody is
100% responsible for his initial endowment and the other extreme corresponds to the
case that nobody is responsible for his endowment at all.
JEL Classication: D50, D60, D70
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1 Introduction
This paper studies a resource allocation problem in which each individual is responsible
but in general only partially for his initial endowment.
Existing normative and axiomatic studies on resource allocation assume either that
everybody is 100% responsible for her initial endowment, or that any such notion of in-
dividual responsibility or entitlement is irrelevant. The former line of thought assumes
that nobody should get worse o than her initial endowment (individual rationality) and
characterizes the Walras rule (see for example Hurwicz (1979), Gevers (1986), Thomson
(1979), Nagahisa (1991), Nagahisa and Suh (1995)). This line of thought imagines that
individuals are entirely responsible for their endowment. In contrast, the latter line of re-
search imagines individuals are not at all responsible for their endowment. This is reected
in the assumption that only the aggregate endowment matters; the additional imposition
of equity axioms typically characterizes the Walras rule starting from equal division (see
for example Nagahisa and Suh (1995), Thomson (1988), Thomson and Zhou (1993)).
In this paper, we imagine that a social planner need not restrict herself to either of
these two ideas; she may have a dierent idea of how responsible each agent is for her
endowment. To this end, we study a family of rules that allows exibility in the degree of
responsibility. Our main contribution is to derive a parametric family of such rules, which
form compromises between the previously discussed families. In order to meaningfully
discuss a parametric notion of responsibility, our notion of rule should, at the very least,
be \single-valued" in very simple cases. We discuss this idea below.
We consider pure-exchange economies with initial endowments but we do not assume
the individual rationality axiom. Instead, we allow that endowments can be redistributed
across the agents; as would happen in modern economies with income redistribution. To
this end, we imagine that all agents in society are necessary participants to the rule; willing
or not. In principle, individuals may try to hide their wealth or endowments, but this is
outside the scope of the model we discuss here.
Our main contribution is an axiomatization of a family of rules, in which the notion of
responsibility takes a parametric form, which is uniquely identied. In view of the second
welfare theorem, the social planner can pick a desired ecient allocation by suitable income
redistribution. Our characterization pins down a class of such income redistribution codes.
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1In general, understanding what type of income redistribution code has been used is
a dicult problem. Individuals' preferences are diverse, and complementarity between
dierent goods can be quite complex. Hence, simply observing preferences and an ecient
allocation, it is impossible in general to \back out" or reverse engineer which type of
redistribution has taken place. There is, however, one case in which we would be able
to uniquely pin this down: the cases in which all individuals have identical and linear
preferences.
In this case, any allocation is ecient and only the only decision to be made is redis-
tributive. For such preference proles, there is a natural measure of welfare that is common
to everybody: the income evaluation of consumption measured by the common marginal
rate of substitution.
On the subdomain of identical linear preferences, we impose an axiom that the welfare
level for each individual should be pinned down uniquely in such cases of purely redistri-
bution problems. In a sense, this is a minimal criterion required for a rule to be considered
a \solution," and reects a positive view that an income redistribution and taxation codes
are immutable. This is a mild requirement, in the sense that it is required to apply only
to the small domain of identical linear preferences, and it does not exclude any reasonably
resolute solution at a conceptual level.
Together with other standard axioms, we characterize a class of allocation rules which
are parametrized by income distribution codes. The class is a natural compromise between
the Walrasian solution and the Walrasian solution from equal division. In particular, we
characterize a one-parameter family of income redistribution codes, in which one extreme
corresponds to the case that each individual is 100% responsible for his initial endowment
and the other extreme corresponds to the case that everybody is not responsible for his
endowment at all.
1Another idea is to consider axioms indexed by certain parameters describing the degree of responsibility,
which is introduced a priori as a part of the setting. In the current paper we focus on a calibration
argument, in which such parameters are not presupposed in the outset but endogenously obtained as a
part of characterization.
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2 The model and axioms
We consider pure exchange economies in which there are n individuals and l goods. Assume
n  3. The consumption space for each individual is Rl+, where consumptions are taken
to be column vectors. Each individual generically denoted by i = 1;    ; n has initial
endowment ei 2 Rl++ which is taken to be variable. Let
e =
0BB@
e1
...
en
1CCA 2 Rnl++
denote an entire prole of initial endowment vectors.2
Let R denote the set of preferences over Rl+ which are complete, transitive, continuous,
convex and strongly monotone.
Let D  Rn be the domain of preferences to be considered. Given any prole R =
(R1;    ; Rn) 2 D, the object Ri denotes individual i's weak preference relation, Pi denotes
the corresponding strict preference relation, and Ii denotes the corresponding indierence
relation.
We assume that D contains the subdomain of identical linear preferences, denoted DIL,
in which any R = (R1;    ; Rn) 2 DIL satises
xiRiyi () pxi  pyi
for all i = 1;    ; n with respect to some common row vector p 2 , where  =n
p 2 Rl+ :
Pl
k=1 pk = 1
o
and  = \Rl++. Every element R 2 DIL is identied with the
corresponding normal vector p 2  that is common across individuals.
The subdomain DIL plays an important role in our argument. It is the domain in which
any allocation is ecient and only distributive properties of allocations are the issue, and
we propose some axioms for such class of pure redistribution problems.
We now dene the feasibility correspondence and social choice correspondence.
2More realistically, it will be reasonable to consider that some individuals do not have strictly pos-
itive endowment vectors, while the social sum is still strictly positive. Allowing individual endowment
vectors to be not strictly positive leads to a well-known problem that Walrasian solution and its relatives
may be empty. As our central issue is calibrating income redistribution, we rule out this problem from
consideration.
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Denition 1 The feasibility correspondence F : Rnl++  Rnl+ is dened by
F (e) =
(
x 2 Rnl+ :
nX
i=1
xi 
nX
i=1
ei
)
for all e 2 Rnl++.
Denition 2 Social choice correspondence is a correspondence ' : D  Rnl++  Rnl+ such
that
x 2 F (e)
and
xi 6= 0
for all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++, x 2 '(R; e) and i = 1    ; n.
Remark 1 Below we will invoke some axioms which are necessary and sucient for Nash
implementability in certain kinds of mechanisms, where the planner does not know the
individuals' preferences. What about the case that the planner does not know their endow-
ments? Hurwicz, Maskin, and Postlewaite (1994) show that excluding zero consumption
vectors is sucient for Nash implementability via a mechanism in which the individual may
destroy (but cannot exaggerate) their endowments.
For this reason, we take the condition that nobody should receive zero consumption
vector as a part of the denition of the social choice correspondence throughout.
The individual rationality condition is still required, though, for Nash implementability
via a mechanism in which the individuals may withhold their endowments.
We consider the following axioms on the social choice correspondence. First one states
that the recommended allocations should not be Pareto-dominated.
Eciency: For all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++ and x 2 '(R; e) there is no x0 2 F (e) such that
x0iRixi for all i = 1;    ; n and x0iPixi for at least one i.
Denition 3 The Pareto correspondence is a correspondence P : D  Rnl++  Rnl++ such
that P (R; e) is the set of ecient allocations for each (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++.
Second axioms states that if there is an allocation which is Pareto-indierent to the
allocation already recommended then it should not be excluded.
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Non-Discrimination: For all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++, x 2 '(R; e) and x0 2 F (e), if x0iIixi for
all i = 1;    ; n, then x0 2 '(R; e).
Dropping the individual rationality axiom leaves it unspecied how much individuals
are responsible for their initial endowments. We argue that it is rather calibrated as a part
of pinning down the solution. It is not an obvious question if such calibration works, as it
is not obvious how much one's endowment is valuable for the society, because in general
individuals' preferences are diverse and complementarity and substitution between goods
are complex.
Therefore we focus on the cases in which we can unambiguously dene how much
an individual contributes to the society. In particular, we focus on the cases that all
individuals have an identical and linear preference and hence any allocation is ecient
and only the distributive properties of allocation are the issue. Within such subdomain
there is a natural measure of welfare that is common to everybody, income evaluation of
consumptions measured by the common marginal rate of substitution.
The axiom below states that welfare level for each individual should be pinned down
uniquely in such pure redistribution problems.
Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences: For all (R; e) 2 DIL 
Rnl++, and x; x0 2 '(R; e), it holds x0iIixi for all i = 1;    ; n.
It is imposed for a positive reason rather than normative, as it is a minimally necessary
condition for a social choice rule to be indeed a \solution." This is rather a very mild
requirement, in the sense that it is required to apply only to the small domain of identical
linear preferences, and it does not exclude any reasonable solution at a conceptual level.
Indeed it is weaker than the standard individual rationality axiom, which states that
nobody should get worse o than his initial endowment.
Individual Rationality: For all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++, and x 2 '(R; e), xiRiei for all
i = 1;    ; n.
Lemma 1 Individual Rationality implies Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Pref-
erences.
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Proof. For all (R; e) 2 DILRnl++, where p 2  denotes the normal vector corresponding
to R, pick any x 2 '(R; e). IR requires pxi  pei for all i = 1;    ; n. If there is some i
with pxi > pei, under the feasibility constraint there is j with pej > pxj, which violates
IR. Therefore pxi = pei for all i = 1;    ; n, which implies welfare uniqueness.
Next two axioms are about informational eciency and implementability which are
standard in the literature. The Maskin monotonicity axiom is known to be necessary for
implementability in Nash equilibria and also sucient for it in the current setting, because
the no veto power condition is vacuously met under n  3 (Maskin (1999)).
Maskin Monotonicity: For all (R; e); (R0; e) 2 D  Rnl++ and x 2 '(R; e), if
xiRiyi =) xiR0iyi
for all i = 1;    ; n and yi 2
n
zi 2 Rl+ : 9z i 2 R(n 1)l+ ; (zi; z i) 2 F (e)
o
, then x 2
'(R0; e).
The following Gevers monotonicity axiom is weaker than Maskin Monotonicity (Gevers
(1986)).
Gevers Monotonicity: For all (R; e); (R0; e) 2 D  Rnl++ and x 2 '(R; e), if
xiRiyi =) xiR0iyi
for all i = 1;    ; n and yi 2 Rl+, then x 2 '(R0; e).
The above axioms characterize a class of market-based mechanisms which are indexed
by income distribution codes.
Denition 4 An income distribution code is a function t :   Rnl++ ! Rn++ such that
nX
i=1
ti(p; e) = p
nX
i=1
ei
hold for all (p; e) 2   Rnl++.
Note that we are making the restriction that all individuals should receive positive income,
in order to be consistent with the assumption that nobody should receive zero consumption
vector.
Here is the denition of the Walras rule with income distribution code.
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Denition 5 Walras rule with income distribution code t is a correspondence Wt : D 
Rnl++  Rnl+ such that for all (R; e) 2 DRnl++ an allocation x 2 Rnl+ belongs to Wt(R; e) if
and only if x 2 F (e) and there exists p 2  such that for all i = 1;    ; n it holds
pxi  ti(p; e)
and it holds
px0i  ti(p; e) =) xiRix0i
for all x0i 2 Rl+.
Likewise we can dene the constrained version of the above, in which possible individual
deviation is limited to socially feasible consumptions.
Denition 6 Constrained Walras rule with income distribution code t is a correspondence
CWt : DRnl++  Rnl+ such that for all (R; e) 2 DRnl++ an allocation x 2 Rnl+ belongs to
CWt(R; e) if and only if x 2 F (e) and there exists p 2  such that for all i = 1;    ; n it
holds
pxi  ti(p; e)
and it holds
px0i  ti(p; e) =) xiRix0i
for all x0i 2 fzi 2 Rl+ : 9z i 2 R(n 1)l+ ; (zi; z i) 2 F (e)g.
The following lemma is straightforward.
Lemma 2 Wt  CWt  P for any income distribution code t.
The lemma below characterizes the Walras rule with income distribution code in the
domain of identical linear preferences.
Lemma 3 If a social choice correspondence ' satises Eciency, Welfare Uniqueness un-
der Identical Linear Preferences and Non-Discrimination, then there is an income distribu-
tion code t such that '(R; e) = Wt(R; e) for all (R; e) 2 DIL  Rnl++.
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Proof. Dene the income distribution code t as follows: For (p; e) 2   Rnl++ and
i = 1;    ; n, let ti(p; e) = pxi for x 2 '(R; e), where R 2 DIL is the prole of identical
linear preferences which has p as the common normal vector.
By Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences, t is well-dened, that is t
does not depend on the choice of x 2 '(R; e).
By Eciency,
Pn
i=1 ti(p; e) = p
Pn
i=1 ei is met,
By denition we have '(R; e)  Wt(R; e). By Non-Discrimination we have '(R; e) 
Wt(R; e).
Because Wt(R; e) = CWt(R; e) for all (R; e) 2 DIL  Rnl++, we also have
Lemma 4 If a social choice correspondence ' satises Welfare Uniqueness under Identical
Linear Preferences and Non-Discrimination, then there is an income distribution code t
such that '(R; e) = CWt(R; e) for all (R; e) 2 DIL  Rnl++.
Here is our rst main result.
Theorem 1 Assume D = Rn. If a social choice correspondence ' satises Eciency,
Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences, Non-Discrimination and Gevers
Monotonicity then there is an income distribution code t such that '(R; e)  Wt(R; e) for
all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++ and equality holds on DIL  Rnl++.
Proof. For any (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++, pick any x 2 Wt(R; e). Let p be the equilibrium price
vector. Let R 2 DIL be the prole of identical linear preferences having p as the common
normal vector.
Then x 2 Wt(R; e) and by the previous lemma we have x 2 '(R; e). By Gevers
Monotonicity we obtain x 2 '(R; e).
Replacing Gevers Monotonicity by Maskin Monotonicity characterizes the constrained
Walras rule with income distribution code.
Theorem 2 Assume D = Rn. If a social choice correspondence ' satises Eciency,
Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences, Non-Discrimination and Maskin
Monotonicity then there is an income distribution code t such that '(R; e)  CWt(R; e)
for all (R; e) 2 D  Rnl++ and equality holds on DIL  Rnl++.
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Proof. For any (R; e) 2 DRnl++, pick any x 2 CWt(R; e). Let p be the equilibrium price
vector. Let R 2 DIL be the prole of identical linear preferences having p as the common
normal vector.
Then x 2 CWt(R; e) and by the previous lemma we have x 2 '(R; e). By Maskin
Monotonicity we obtain x 2 '(R; e).
3 Domain of smooth or identical linear preferences
Let S  R be the set of strongly monotone and strictly convex preferences which are
smooth on Rl++ and satisfy the boundary condition, i.e., fz0 2 Rl+ : zIz0g  Rl++ for all
R 2 S and for all z 2 Rl++. See Debreu (1972) and Mas-Colell (1985) for the detailed
mathematical denition of smooth preferences.
For each individual i, given Ri 2 S and its dierentiable representation ui, the marginal
rate of substitution of good k for m at xi 2 Rl++ for individual i is given by
MRSkm(xi; Ri) =
@ui(xi)
@xim
@ui(xi)
@xik
Here we consider the domain of smooth or identical linear preferences D = Sn [ DIL,
where DIL is viewed as consisting of limit points of proles in Sn.
The following local independence axiom (Nagahisa (1991)) is an informational eciency
condition which states that only marginal rates of substitution should matter. When n  3
it is known to be necessary and suciency condition for implementability in Nash equilibria
via "economic" mechanism, where messages to be submitted take the form of prices and
quantities (see Dutta, Sen and Vohra (1994)).
Local Independence: For all (R; e); (R0; e) 2 (Sn [ DIL)  Rnl++ and x 2 Rnl++, if
MRSkm(xi; Ri) = MRSkm(xi; R
0
i) for all i = 1;    ; n and k;m = 1;    ; l, then
x 2 '(R; e) if and only if x 2 '(R0; e).
Lemma 5 Under Eciency, Local Independence implies Gevers Monotonicity on D =
Sn [ DIL.
Proof. Pick any (R; e); (R0; e) 2 (Sn [DIL)Rnl++ and x 2 '(R; e). Suppose it holds that
xiRiyi =) xiR0iyi
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for all i = 1;    ; n and yi 2 Rl+.
There are two cases
Case 1: R 2 DIL
If R0 2 DIL we have R0 = R, which implies x 2 '(R0; e). Otherwise, Eciency implies
that x is an interior allocation.
Then, by the nature of smooth preferences it must be thatMRSkm(xi; Ri) = MRSkm(xi; R
0
i)
for all i = 1;    ; n and k;m = 1;    ; l, otherwise the indierence surfaces cross. By Local
Independence we have x 2 '(R0; e).
Case 2: R 2 Sn
By Eciency x is an interior allocation. Then we follow the same argument as above.
Together with other axioms the local independence axiom implies that the social choice
correspondence must be a selection of the Walrasian correspondence with some income
distribution code.
Theorem 3 Assume D = Sn[DIL. If a social choice correspondence ' satises Eciency,
Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences and Local Independence, then there
is an income distribution code t such that '(R; e)  Wt(R; e) for all (R; e) 2 DRnl++ and
equality holds on DIL  Rnl++.
Proof. For any (R; e) 2 SnRnl++, pick any x 2 '(R; e). By Eciency and the smoothness
of preference x must be an interior allocation and there is a unique supporting vector p.
Let R 2 DIL be the prole of identical linear preferences having p as the common normal
vector.
By Local Independence we have x 2 '(R; e). Since '(R; e) = Wt(R; e) as R 2 DIL,
we have x 2 Wt(R; e). By the property of Wt, we obtain x 2 Wt(R; e).
Because Local Independence implies Gevers Monotonicity on the domain of smooth or
identical linear preferences we have a full characterization of the Walras rule with income
distribution code.
Theorem 4 Assume D = Sn [ DIL. Then a social choice correspondence ' satises
Eciency, Welfare Uniqueness under Identical Linear Preferences, Non-Discrimination and
Local Independence if and only if there is an income distribution code t such that ' = Wt.
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Proof. It is straightforward to see that Wt satises all the axioms. So we prove suciency
of the axioms.
Because Local Independence implies Gevers Monotonicity, we can apply the same ar-
gument as in Theorem 1 and obtain '  Wt.
On the other hand, '  Wt follows from Theorem 3.
4 Comparative properties
Now we investigate comparative properties of the allocation rule. Walrasian solution and
its relatives are known to have tricky comparative properties when preferences are di-
verse. Transfer paradox and violation of resource monotonicity are typical examples of
this, where having larger endowments may hurt of the individual and others, since having
more resources may change how goods are substituted with each other.
Thus we consider comparative properties on the domain of identical linear preferences,
in which such properties are fairly intuitive. Note again that imposing conditions to meet
only in the small domain of identical linear preferences is a mild and less demanding
requirement, rather than doing so on the whole domain of preferences.
First we impose an axiom that having larger endowments should not hurt anybody.
Restricted Endowment Monotonicity: For all R 2 DIL and e; e0 2 Rnl++, if e0iRiei
for all i = 1;    ; n then for all x 2 '(R; e) and x0 2 '(R; e0) it holds x0iRixi for all
i = 1;    ; n.
Restricted Endowment Monotonicity characterizes the class of income distribution codes
in which only the lists of individual incomes should matter.
Lemma 6 Suppose ' = Wt holds for some income distribution code t on DILRnl++. Then
' satises Restricted Endowment Monotonicity additionally if and only if it holds
pej  pe0j 8j = 1;    ; n =) ti(p; e)  ti(p; e0):
for all i = 1;    ; n, for all p 2  and e; e0 2 Rnl++.
Next axiom states that allocations are linear in initial endowment vectors when all
individuals have identical and linear preferences. Consider that there are two dierent
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resource allocation problems with dierent initial endowment vectors and that the society
is deciding allocation after consolidating the two problems. Then, when all individuals
have identical and linear preferences the order of such consolidation should not matter.
Restricted Endowment Linearity: For all R 2 DIL and e; e0 2 Rnl++, for all ;  > 0,
for all x 2 '(R; e) and x0 2 '(R; e0), it holds x+ x0 2 '(R;e+ e0).
Restricted Endowment Linearity characterizes the class of income distribution codes
which are linear in initial endowment vectors. The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 7 Suppose ' = Wt holds for some income distribution code t on DILRnl++. Then
' satises Restricted Endowment Linearity additionally if and only if
ti(p; e+ e
0) = ti(p; e) + ti(p; e0)
for all p 2  and i = 1;    ; n, and for all e; e0 2 Rnl++ and ;  > 0.
To explain the next axiom, let us introduce a mixture operation over the domain of
identical linear preferences. Given R;R0 2 DIL, let p; p0 and be the common normal
vectors corresponding to them respectively. Then, for  2 [0; 1], let R  (1   )R0 
(R1 (1 )R01;    ; Rn (1 )R0n) 2 DIL be the prole of identical linear preferences
given by
xi(Ri  (1  )R0i)yi () (p+ (1  )p0)xi  (p+ (1  )p0)yi
for all i.
To illustrate, imagine that two societies merge so that household i in one society forms
a joint household with its counterpart household i in the latter, where the proportion of
merging is the same across household identities. As all the households in both societies
have linear preferences merging has no complementarity eect. As all the households in
each society before merging have identical preferences it is natural that the merging with
common proportion does not change welfare weights put over the households. Hence the
welfare levels for the society consisting of the merged households are simply the correspond-
ing mixture of the welfare levels given in the original societies before merging. This is what
is said by the axiom below.
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Restricted Preference Linearity: For all R;R0 2 DIL and e 2 Rnl++, for all  2 [0; 1],
for all x 2 '(R; e), x0 2 '(R0; e) and ex 2 '(R (1  )R0; e), it holds
(p+ (1  )p0)exi = pxi + (1  )p0x0i;
where p and p0 are the common normal vectors corresponding to R and R0, respec-
tively.
To motivate further, imagine a situation that there are l states of the world and the
society is deciding how to allocate state-contingent consumptions, in which with probability
 the society consists of risk neutral households all with an identical belief p and with
probability 1   the society consists of risk neutral households all with an identical belief
p0. Then, from an ex-ante viewpoint the society is viewed as consisting of risk neutral
households with an identical belief p+(1 )p0. Then the axioms states that the household
should receive the ex-ante expected values of welfare.
Restricted Preference Linearity characterizes the class of income distribution codes
which are linear in price vectors. The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 8 Suppose ' = Wt holds for some income distribution code t on DILRnl++. Then
' satises Restricted Preference Linearity additionally if and only if
ti(p+ (1  )p0; e) = ti(p; e) + (1  )ti(p0; e)
for all e 2 Rnl++ and i = 1;    ; n, and for all p; p0 2  and  2 [0; 1].
The last axiom is a weaker version of the anonymity axiom, which will not need expla-
nation.
Restricted Anonymity: For all (R; e) 2 DILRnl++ and any permutation  : f1;    ; ng !
f1;    ; ng, x 2 '(R; e) if and only if x 2 '(R; e), where zi = z 1(i) for each
i = 1;    ; n for any object z with n-entries.
The following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 9 Suppose ' = Wt holds for some income distribution code t on DIL  Rnl++.
Then ' satises Anonymity additionally if and only if for all (p; e) 2   Rnl++ and any
permutation  : f1;    ; ng ! f1;    ; ng it holds
t(p; e) = (t(p; e))
for all (p; e) 2   Rnl++.
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The above four additional axioms characterize a one-parameter family of income distri-
bution codes.
Theorem 5 Suppose ' = Wt holds for some income distribution code t on DIL  Rnl++.
Then ' satises Restricted Endowment Monotonicity, Restricted Endowment Linearity,
Restricted Preference Linearity and Restricted Anonymity additionally if and only if there
exists a constant  2 [0; 1] such that
ti(p; e) = pei + (1  )pe i
for all (p; e) 2   Rnl++ and i = 1;    ; n, where e i = 1n 1
P
j 6=i ej.
Proof. Fix any i = 1;    ; n.
From Lemma 7 and 8, we can extend ti to a bi-linear mapping over RlRnl as follows.
First, dene ti : Rl++  Rnl++ ! R++ by
ti (p; e) =
1
(p)
ti((p)p; e)
where (p) > 0 is such that (p)p 2 .
Then, from Lemma 8, for all p; p0 2 Rl++ and ; 0 > 0, we have
ti (p; e) + 
0ti (p
0; e) =

(p)
ti((p)p; e) +
0
(p0)
ti((p
0)p0; e)
=


(p)
+
0
(p0)
 
(p)

(p)
+ 
0
(p0)
ti((p)p; e) +
0
(p0)

(p)
+ 
0
(p0)
ti((p
0)p0; e)
!
=


(p)
+
0
(p0)

ti
 

(p)

(p)
+ 
0
(p0)
(p)p+
0
(p0)

(p)
+ 
0
(p0)
(p0)p0; e
!
=


(p)
+
0
(p0)

ti
 
p+ 0p0

(p)
+ 
0
(p0)
; e
!
= ti (p+ 
0p0; e);
where (p); (p0) > 0 are such that (p)p; (p0)p0 2 .
From Lemma 7, for all e; e0 2 Rnl++ and ; 0 > 0 it holds
ti (p; e+ 
0e0) =
1
(p)
ti((p)p; e+ 
0e0)
=

(p)
ti((p)p; e) +
0
(p)
ti((p)p; e
0)
= ti (p; e) + 
0ti (p; e
0)
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where (p) > 0 is such that (p)p 2 .
Second, dene ti : Rl  Rnl++ ! R by
ti (q; e) = t

i (p; e)  ti (p0; e);
where p; p0 2 Rl++ are such that q = p  p0.
Note that
ti (0; e) = t

i (p; e)  ti (p; e) = 0
and
ti ( p; e) = ti (p; e)  ti (2p; e) = ti (p; e)  2ti (p; e) =  ti (p; e) =  ti (p; e):
From the property shown in the previous step, for all q; q0 2 Rl and ; 0 2 R, we have
ti (q + 
0q0; e) = ti (q; e) + 
0ti (q
0; e):
Again it maintains the property that
ti (q; e+ 
0e0) = ti (q; e) + 
0ti (q; e
0)
holds for all e; e0 2 Rnl++ and ; 0 > 0.
Finally, dene ti : Rl  Rnl ! R by
ti (q; a) = t

i (q; e)  ti (q; e0);
where e; e0 2 Rnl++ are such that a = e  e0.
Note that
ti (q;0) = t

i (q; e)  ti (q; e) = 0
and
ti (q; e) = ti (q; e)  ti (q; 2e) = ti (q; e)  2ti (q; e) =  ti (q; e):
Then, for all q 2 Rl, for all a; a0 2 Rnl and ; 0 2 R it holds
ti (q; a+ 
0a0) = ti (q; a) + 
0ti (q; a
0):
Again it maintains the property that
ti (q + 
0q0; a) = ti (q; a) + 
0ti (q
0; a)
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holds for all q; q0 2 Rl and ; 0 2 R.
Because ti is a homogeneous extension of ti over to Rl++  Rnl++, from Restricted En-
dowment Monotonicity it holds that
qaj  qa0j 8j = 1;    ; n =) ti (q; a)  ti (q; a0)
for all i = 1;    ; n.
Because ti is a continuous extension of t

i , this property is extended to Rl+  Rnl+ at
least. Note also that the monotonicity property and linearity imply that
qaj = 0 8j = 1;    ; n =) ti (q; a) = 0
for all (q; a) 2 Rl+  Rnl+ , because it holds qaj = q(2aj) = 0 for all j = 1;    ; n let's say,
and hence ti (q; a) = t

i (q; 2a) = 2t

i (q; a), implying t

i (q; a) = 0.
Finally, from its denition, t inherits the property following Restricted Anonymity:
t(q; a) = (t(q; a))
hold for all q 2 Rl and a; a0 2 Rnl, and for all permutation  : f1;    ; ng ! f1;    ; ng.
For each h = 1;    ; l, let vh 2 Rl+ denote the vector having 1 as its h-th entry and 0
for else. For each j = 1;    ; n and k = 1;    ; l, let wj;k 2 Rnl+ denote the vector having 1
as its (j; k)-th entry and 0 for else. That is, when wj;k; denotes the (; )-th entry of vector
wj;k, where  goes from 1 to n and  goes from 1 to l, it holds wj;k; = 1 only when  = j
and  = k and wj;k; = 0 otherwise.
For i = 1;    ; n, h = 1;    ; l and (j; k) with j = 1;    ; n, k = 1;    ; l, let
Ti;h;(j;k) = t

i (v
h; wj;k):
Then by the bilinear property shown above we obtain
ti (q; a) = t

i
 
lX
h=1
qhv
h;
nX
j=1
lX
k=1
aj;kw
j;k
!
=
lX
h=1
qht

i
 
vh;
nX
j=1
lX
k=1
aj;kw
j;k
!
=
lX
h=1
nX
j=1
lX
k=1
qhaj;kt

i
 
vh; wj;k

=
lX
h=1
nX
j=1
lX
k=1
Ti;h;(j;k)qhaj;k
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Note that
Pl
=1 v
h
w
j;k
; = 0 for all  = 1;    ; n whenever h 6= k. This together with
the property shown above, i.e.,
qaj = 0 8j = 1;    ; n =) ti (q; a) = 0
for all (q; a) 2 Rl+  Rnl+ , implies Ti;h;(j;k) = ti
 
vh; wj;k

= 0 for all h 6= k.
Note that for every k; h = 1;    ; l with h 6= k, we have Pl=1(vk + vh )wj;kj; = 1 andPl
=1(v
k
 + v
h
 )w
j;k
; = 0 for all  6= j, and likewise
Pl
=1(v
k
 + v
h
 )w
j;h
j; = 1 and
Pl
=1(v
k
 +
vh )w
j;h
; = 0 for all  6= j. Therefore we have
ti (v
k + vh; wj;k) = ti (v
k + vh; wj;h):
Since ti (v
h; wj;k) = ti (v
k; wj;h) = 0, we have
ti (v
k; wj;k) = ti (v
h; wj;h);
which implies
Ti;k;(j;k) = Ti;h;(j;h)
for all k; h = 1;    ; l.
Hence, we can let bTi;j = Ti;k;(j;k) for arbitrary k = 1;    ; l, and obtain the form
ti (p; e) =
nX
j=1
bTi;j lX
k=1
pkej;k:
From the properties already obtained it holds bTi;j  0 for all j = 1;    ; n and
nX
j=1
bTi;j = 1:
By the property following from Restricted Anonymity, we have bTi;i = bTj;j, bTi;j = bTj;i
and bTi; = bTi; for all i; j and ;  6= i. That is, bT is a symmetric nn bi-stochastic matrix
such that all the diagonal entries are equal to each other and all the o-diagonal entries
are equal to each other.
Hence bT takes the form bT = I + (1  )E;
where I is the n  n identity matrix and E is the n  n matrix with all diagonal entries
being 0 and all o-diagonal entries being 1
n 1 .
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Note that in the above class: (i) when  = 1 it is the case of no redistribution, where
ti(p; e) = pei for each i; (ii) when  =
1
n
it is the case of equal division of social income,
where ti(p; e) = pe for each i with e =
1
n
Pn
j=1 ej, and (iii) when  = 0 it is the case of
receiving the others' average income, where ti(p; e) = pe i.
The class of income redistribution codes we have characterized violates so-called recur-
sive invariance (except when  = 1
n
), which states in the context of quasi-linear bargaining
that once the prescribed allocation is taken to be the initial endowment reapplying the rule
does not change the allocation (see Chun (1989), Green (2005)). This shows that where the
original endowments are coming from does really matter in our argument. In other words,
there is a distinction between endowments before redistribution, for which individuals are
only partially responsible in general, and endowments after redistribution for which the
individuals are now supposed to be responsible.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have axiomatically studied the problem of resource allocation in which each
individual is taken to be responsible but in general only partially for his initial endowment.
In our argument how much individuals are responsible is rather calibrated as a part of
pinning down the solution.
We have characterized a class of allocation rules which lie between the Walras rule
taking initial endowments as they are and the Walras rule starting from equal division,
which are parametrized by income redistribution codes.
Also, we have characterized a one-parameter family of income redistribution codes, in
which one extreme corresponds to the case that each individual is 100% responsible for his
initial endowment and the other extreme corresponds to the case that everybody is not
responsible for this endowment at all.
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